5 Things to See and Do in Amhara Region

It’s hard to overstate Ethiopia as a travel destination. It has fascinating and unique history and culture, sites to visit and activities to do, a combination of anthropological and wild natural beauty- in short, all the things you would look for, from a range of travel backgrounds. In addition, Ethiopian Airlines has a safe, wide-reaching and very economical domestic network making it easy to get from place to place. The cost of food, accomodation and activities are all very low, the country is safe and stable (with the exception of some border regions), and the Ethiopian peoples are, as a rule, gentle and friendly. And finally, while there is a significant tourism business here, the place is not overrun by ferengi, so you don’t need to feel like you’re part of a giant guided tour.

If that doesn’t entice you to come for a visit, let me give you a short and very non-exhaustive list of things you can do in Amhara Region, one of the more popular travel destinations.

Note: I’ve generally quoted prices in Birr. The exchange rate is roughly USD 1: ETB 18.

1. Rock-Hewn Churches of Lalibela

The rock-hewn churches of Lalibela, UNESCO World Heritage listed, are possibly Ethiopia’s most famous tourist draw- and unsurprisingly-so. While the most famous of these- the cross-shaped Bete Giorgis (St George’s Church), sometimes refered to as the 8^th Wonder of the World- features prominently in photographs, there are in fact a constellation of structure scattered around this small mountain village. The main dozen-or-so churches are clustered in three groups, all within easy walk of one another, carved into trenches out of the solid rock itself rather than constructed using bricks or blocks. They are connected by tunnels and passageways, worn by centuries of use (the churches are active to this day).

The churches themselves- St. Lalibela is said to have built the town and its icons around his memories of Jerusalem from time spent there in his youth- are tall and blocky, I suspect reminiscent of the Jewish Temple/Tarbernacle. In the Orthodox style, they have an outer area for the congregation, and then an inner sanctuary like the Holy Place, concealed behind a thick curtain, into which only priests can enter. Flash photography is forbidden, and shoes must be removed at the door. The insides are furnished with rugs and icons, dimly lit, some distinctly cavernous in mood.

The Lalibela churches, built in the 12^th & 13^th centuries, rate right up there with the most interesting and enjoyable archeological sites I’ve ever visited- right on a par with somewhere like Angkor Wat. Exploring the churches and passageways is a hoot, and in style true to the continent, there are no ropes or overly-cautious shepherding of visitors through set passageways. If you want to plunge to your death over a 50-foot rocky ledge, that’s your own dumb fault. We spent an afternoon and saw perhaps half the churches, but it was a rush job. I’d recommend you block out two days to take your time, explore the nooks and crannies, and really soak in the otherworldly atmosphere of this interesting place.

Lalibela village is probably the most touristed of Ethiopian locales, and because of its small size and big draw, it’s the one place in Ethiopia where you’re likely to trip over other foreigners. The kids will strike up conversation in any of the major tourist languages- I tried English, French and Spanish, and I suspect Italian and Russian are on the menu too- and will try the usual ways to get you to give them money- ask for foreign coins (we’re collecting coins for a school project), ask for footballs (we had a football team but the ball burst so now we can’t play), invite you home for coffee, or offer to guide you into the hills to see another church. They are harmless, and if you politely tell them to leave you alone (assuming you don’t want the banter, which can be entertaining), they generally will.

You can reach Lalibela by road, but most people fly in- there are a couple of flights daily to and from Addis, doing a loop via Gondar and Aksum. Shared minivans cost a set 70 Birr one-way for the 30-minute ride between the airport and the village, which is perched on a shoulder at around 2,500m above the valley. The ride is visually spectacular, as are the views from the village. A pass to visit all the churches costs 350 Birr and lasts for several days- you buy it at the tourist booth as you head into the first of the church complexes. You will be asked for it regularly, and if you get a pass with several friends, you’ll need to stay together (as I found out to my frustration). Guides are on offer and are entirely up to personal preference. The complex is self-explanatory and fun to explore alone, and we didn’t bother. There is plenty of material available online on the history of the churches, but if you want somebody to take you round and tell you stuff, that works too. Note that guides are of varying quality- and may spin things that aren’t true.

The Seven Olives Hotel, on the main road, has pleasant leafy gardens and a terrace overlooking the valley, and makes a lovely spot to have lunch. The Mountain View and the newer Cliff Edge Hotels have dramatic views from their exposed locations, the former with one of the towns better options for dinner. Consider booking, as it can get full during peak times.

2. Fasilides Castle, Gondar

When King Fasilides made Gondar the seat of his empire in the 1600s, he constructed a palace that would eventually sprawl into a large complex, as children and grandchildren added their own buildings to the compound. Set in the heart of what is now one of Ethiopia’s largest cities (still fairly small at around a quarter of a million people), the palace complex is a mixture of beautifully-preserved period architecture with European and Moorish influences, and rambling ruins.

Interestingly, Fasilides’ Castle itself is the best-preserved, and you can wander through its lower halls and explore its nooks and pockets. Elsewhere are reservoirs and steam-baths, the remains of kitchens and stables, even the enclosures for leopards and lions that used to grace the grounds. The place has a ramshackle feel in many ways, the buildings a little haphazard in their placing, but it makes for a great afternoon’s exploring.

As with Lalibela, guides are on offer (for a fee) but entirely optional. It’s fun and freeing just to explore by yourself, although again, if getting historical explanation is part and parcel of the experience for you, go for it. Entrance costs 100 Birr for a tourist, and will also give access to Fasilides’ baths, a ceremonial complex a five minute bajaj (tuk-tuk) ride away. The Castle sits by the Town Centre, where buses and taxis both drop off, and is hard to miss.

The Goha Hotel sits on top of a hill overlooking the town itself, and is a grand place to enjoy dinner and a drink (ideally a Daschen Beer, as their Brewery is in Gondar, so the stuff is fresh). I can’t comment on the rooms, but it looks like one of the town’s better hotels. There are plenty of cheaper options.

3. Blue Nile Falls

The Blue Nile- the shorter but higher-volume tributary of the Nile River vis-a-vis its chromatic counterpart, the White Nile- flows out of Lake Tana just a few kilometres north of Amhara’s administrative capital Bahir Dar. From there it flows thirty or forty kilometres eastward, and tumbles over a precipice. Its flow split between a hydro-electric power-station and the falls themselves, the flow over the falls can vary depending on season and the functioning of the power station, from not much more than a trickle, to a thundering wall of water 400m wide and up to 45m high.

I’ve seen the falls twice- once with the power-station turned off and water diverted over the waterfall, and once with lower flow. Both times were visually dramatic. The water spouts over and throws up a steady mist, creating swirling winds that gust over the little plateau at the falls’ base. A winding canyon is carved into the hillscape below the falls, and another narrow stream joins as well, over which is hung a suspension footbridge. It’s possible to walk almost to the base of the falls (although the mist makes it hard to take photos without spotting your lens), and it’s also possible to walk around to the very top of the falls (see earlier comment about lack of ropes and plunging to death). The view leaning out over the rock ledge above the cascading brown water is quite spectacular. When the water level is low, it’s also kind of fun walking in the ‘bed’ of the Nile to check out the falls.

It’s about a 45 minute picturesque car journey through open farmland from Bahir Dar to the falls- known locally as Tis Abay (Abay being the Amharic name for the Blue Nile). There is public transport (minivans), or alternatively, you can negotiate a hotel shuttle- we were quoted 800 Birr. Bajajs would struggle with the gravel road, and would probably take about 3 hours each way for the journey, so don’t try that option. In the small village of Tissisat, you pay an entrance fee (around 70 Birr, if I remember), then walk or drive to the river crossing about 500m upstream. A motor launch shuttles you across the channel for 10 Birr each way per person, and then it’s a 15 minute walk through gentle countryside to the site of the falls themselves. Children sell scarves and drinks at the top, but are generally good-natured and easily dissuaded.

There’s a second approach to the falls which involves a four-hour walk through local villages, coming up on the cascade from the other direction, which sounds like an enjoyable trip to make. I’d love to see the falls in flood, as I suspect it would be an awesome sight. None the less, the Blue Nile Falls should be a must-see on any Amharic agenda if you’re in Bahir Dar.

4. Lake Tana Monasteries

There are some sixty-odd Orthodox monasteries, apparently, scattered around Lake Tana. The Lake is Ethiopia’s biggest, source of the Blue Nile, and stretches northwards from Bahir Dar. The monasteries are situated around the lake’s edge, and on a number of small islets that dot the waters. And they’re open for business.

Checking out Lake Tana’s monasteries is one of the more unique things you can do in Ethiopia. I guess the idea behind any real monastery is an element of isolation or seclusion, but short of the needle-top monasteries of Meteora, in Greece, these guys really seem to be ahead of the curve. Started seven hundred years ago, these isolated little pockets of meditation are really worth checking out.

We visited three monasteries (all we had time for in a single afternoon). The first was at the mouth of the Nile, on what was said to be an island (though could also have been a little peninsula), surrounded by papyrus reeds, with a small village and an assortment of fruit trees to keep it company. The church at the heart of the complex was typical Orthodox style, a round shell with roof made from bamboo and leather strapping. The other two we visited were far more isolated, out in the centre of the shallow lake (Tana never gets deeper than 9m) on hilly little islets a couple of hundred metres across, if that. The sense of isolation was tangible, the natural beauty striking. It’d be hard to come up with a more idyllic place to spend ten years of your life meditating on scripture, if that’s your thing.

Getting out to the monasteries, you can hire a launch and driver from the lake’s edge in Bahir Dar. Rates vary by number of passengers, number of monasteries, and time. Three pax, three monastaries, and a good four hours or more on the water cost us about 700 Birr for the boat and driver. I’m sure that rate could be brought down with some good bargaining. Once you reach the islands, there is also an entry fee of 100 Birr per monastery. We hired a guide at the first stop (not knowing the protocol) for about 150 Birr, found him to be useless and factually vague, and also noted that after that first stop, there were no more guides available, so really, I wouldn’t recommend getting a guide. The two things worth noting: First, take your shoes off before entering the churches, and second, the inner sanctuary is holy, and non-Priests cannot enter, so don’t.

All up, factoring in driver, boat and entry fees, by Ethiopian standards, it’s a pretty pricey day. As much as the islands themselves, the journey is a big part of the fun, and we enjoyed lounging on our little boat in the choppy afternoon winds, chatting, dozing and enjoying the sunshine. It’s a relaxed, slow-paced and memorable half-day trip, highly recommended.

5. Flying Gondar-Aksum-Lalibela

Ethiopia’s domestic airways can be a bit of a shuttle-run, with short hops between multiple towns en route to your destination, and I was initially disappointed to find that our jump from Gondar to Lalibela- a very short flight in a straight line- first went via Aksum, almost on the Eritrean border. Each leg of the flight in the 80-seater Bombardier Q400 lasted just over 30 minutes. And the scenery was epic.

The flight takes you over the top of the Simien Mountains, to the north of Gondar. The mountains are sheer, craggy, riven by improbably deep valleys and split by rock walls that rise giddyingly out of the shadows. They’re a breathtaking view, and I spent the flight with my face glued to the window.

Approaching Aksum, the scenery is a dry patchwork of terraces and smallholdings set against a jagged horizon, also eye-popping. The leg from there South-East towards Lalibella skirts further to the east of the Simiens (still very visible as you fly past), and then the terrain breaks into a vast jumble of flat-topped hills and steep gullies, almost uninhabited and truly some of the wildest, most inaccessible landscape you can picture. Once clearly an upland plateau and now eroded by eons of flowing water, it’s a scene that leaves itself burned on your memory.

The plane flies at around 20,000 feet, but given that the landscape is already up at around 8-10,000 feet in places, it means you’re not so far off the ground, and at this time of year, the sky is cloudless. Sitting on the right-hand side of the plane (seat L) and far forward or far back gives the best view. I recommend 11L, which is right at the front on the right, and by good fortune was what I was given without realising the treat that was in store. None the less, despite being just a part of the travel process, the two flight legs became one of the strongest memories of that particular trip.

From a cost perspective, the itinerary Addis Ababa-Bahir Dar, then Gondar-Lalibela-Addis Ababa, came to a total of $160.

5 Quick Travel Tips

1. Public transportation has a fixed price. While taxis and bajajs will try and fleece you (and, given how cheap everything else is in Ethiopia, boy are they pricey), there’s usually a fixed cost for minivans that doesn’t require bartering, and doesn’t change between locals and ferengi. It’s worth finding out this price ahead of time, on the offchance that you do meet an unscrupulous tout on a minivan or some-such. The prices are generally pretty cheap for intercity travel. The 3-hour journey from Bahir Dar to Gondar costs 65 Birr ($3.60). The van from Lalibela airport to Lalibela town, by contrast, was 70 Birr for a half-hour trip- captive market. As a footnote, do bear in mind that the intercity minivans are a fairly unsafe form of travel- they roll and crash regularly, with high fatality rates.

2. Bring toilet paper. This one’s a no-brainer for anybody who’s travelled in the third world. But trust me, Ethiopia’s one of the worst offenders when it comes to disgruntled bowels- some combination of a relatively poor country, and high altitude (meaning water doesn’t necessarily sterilized when boiled due to the fact that water boils at a lower temperature at altitude; it’s the same reason so many people get sick in Nepal). I haven’t yet met anyone who’s spent any significant time out here and not had a bout of gastro of one form or another (myself included), and some of it’s nasty. While higher quality hotels will probably have toilet paper, cheaper places won’t (and practice your squat for the latrines). Of course, at the risk of going the TMI route, it should be pointed out that if you find yourself on round six or seven for the night cleaning yourself, some water and your left hand is far more soothing to tender areas than another scrape of dry paper. Just wash well.

Also, bring antibiotics.

3. Local ID gets cheaper rates. Often. Not always. But if you’re lucky enough to be in posession of a residency permit, even a temporary one, hotels will often discount room-rates (not as much as for an Ethiopian, but it’s a start), and you can also enter some tourist facilities at a reduced rate too.

4. Beware the cultural restaurant. Ethiopian dancing is pretty amazing stuff. And the music is interesting too. I really do recommend checking out one of the high-quality cultural restaurants in Addis Ababa- some place like Yod Abyssinia just off TeleBole Rd, for example. The dancers are energetic and skillful, and though the music is about 40dB too loud, it’s an unforgettable experience.

Once.

Unfortunately, there is an assumption that a tourist in Ethiopia must want to be serenaded in this fashion every time they eat. At restaurants frequented by ferengi, expect to find traditional performers, many of whom can be quite lacklustre, and whose musical escapades will leave your ears ringing. It makes conversation very difficult. They usually hit around the 6.30-8pm mark, so eating early or late can mitigate this particular travel hassle which, I’d have to say, our little posse found far more intrusive to our holiday pleasure than the kids approaching us for conversation and money.

5. Warm clothes/layers. At this time of year (December), Ethiopia’s pretty chilly. And by that I mean cold. At night time anyway. Days can be deceptively warm. The air is still and the sun bright, and you’ll want to be in short sleeves (with sunscreen) or thinly covered (as dress standards may dictate in places like monastaries). But within half an hour of sunset, you can expect the air to have a real bite. Most of these places are well above 2,000m (6,000ft) and this might be Africa, and not far off the equator, but it’s downright frigid at night time.

Budget

As I mentioned at the start of this post, Ethiopia is pretty cheap, especially compared to the rest of Africa. To give you an idea, if you eat at western-style restaurants, unless you’re staying in a spa resort, you can expect to pay well less than 100 Birr ($5.50) for a main, and no more than 30 Birr ($1.65) for a beer or soft-drink (imported wine is more expensive- 400-800 Birr ($22-44) for a bottle of South African, for example). Eating at restaurant targeting local Ethiopians, you can get away with a total meal cost of less than 40 Birr ($2.20), including soft drink (though you do need to watch food hygeine if your constitution isn’t bomb-proof). Three of us regularly ate at nice hotel-restaurants and generally paid less than 300 Birr ($16.65) for the full tab- and we weren’t trying to keep the cost down in the slightest.

Hotels vary with quality. Staying at a local pension, a small room with a toilet might go for under 200 Birr ($11) a night, a room without a toilet 150 Birr ($8.30) or less (I have paid 70 Birr- $3.80- for one such). At the better end, you can get a decent, clean and moderately-well appointed room (3-star standard in a good location) for 6-800 Birr ($33-44) in one of the better quality hotels in any of these places.

5 More Things to See and Do in Amhara Region

I’m hoping to have the chance to do more travel in the area, as there are still plenty of things I haven’t had a chance to check out yet. Among them:

1. Hike the Simien Mountains. From what people say, this is the thing to do in Ethiopia- possibly alongside the Lalibela churches. The scenery is apparently breathtaking (I can believe it, from what I saw from the air), and everybody who has done it has raved about it.

2. Hike the Lalibela area. There are apparently walks in the hills, as well as churches away from the town itself. The landscape around Lalibela is rugged and beautiful, and they say it also greens up during the rainy season. I’m keen to try this out.

3. Aksum. This isn’t technically Amhara- it’s in Tigray Region- but it’s easily accessible from Gondar and the Simiens find themselves halfway between Gondar and Aksum. There’s supposedly more UNESCO World Heritage goodness with the remnants of the ancient Aksumite Kingdom, and the landscape makes me want to check it out.

4. Gondar Area Castles. As well as Fasilides and his mob, I understand there are more old castles, forts and/or churches in the Gondar area. The terrain is just beautiful round there as well, so it would be well worth an explore over a couple of days.

5. Explore the Southern Hinterlands. South of Bahir Dar, there’s not much by way of tourist infrastructure, but I was lucky enough to drive through it on field visits. The landscape is lush and dramatic, and it would be a fantastic place to spend several days idling through, taking photos, and soaking in the slow pace.

Why Nothing’s Going to Change Between the Sudans in a Hurry

The last couple of days, Sudan’s President Omar al Bashir, and South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir, have been meeting here in Addis Ababa, ostensibly to try and break through a number of contentious issues between the two nations that have kept them on the brink of open warfare for some time now.

For those not familiar with the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, try here for an overview. However in brief, there are several critical issues on the table at this particular time. One is the status of the disputed town of Abyei and its environs- control of which gives great leverage over the rich oil fields in South Sudan. Abyei has been a flashpoint between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) for years, and has its own UN peacekeeping base to prove it.

A second issue is restarting the flow of oil from those southern oil fields. While the fields themselves and the pumping infrastructure are all in southern-held territory, the pipeline runs through Sudan and exits at Port Sudan, all controlled by Khartoum. Therefore while profits from the sale of oil will accrue to the southern government in Juba, Sudan has a right to levy fees on the oil as it runs through it. Loss of the oil-fields to the south were arguably the biggest sore-point in the 2005 Naivasha peace accords for Bashir, so it was little surprise when Khartoum started to demand vast- almost unsustainable- fees on South Sudan for the right to pump oil through its sovereign territory. In response, Juba shut down pumping altogether, denying both north and south any oil revenue at all. Khartoum is demanding recompense for unpaid oil fees, and the south is demanding Khartoum reduce its tax on oil. While steps have been taken to resolve this and reach an agreement on the final per-barrel cost, it will still be months before oil starts flowing again, taking a big swipe out of Sudan’s economy, but all but crippling South Sudan’s.

The third major point of contention between the two nations are the two ongoing conflicts, one in South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, and the other in Blue Nile State. In each case, rebels backed by Juba (a fact generally acknowledged, but denied by Kiir) are fighting Sudanese government forces in northern territory, ostensibly in defence of southern-allied civilian populations who are being targeted by Khartoum. From their side, the rebels (SPLA-North and other allied militia) claim that the SAF is carrying out campaigns of ethnic slaughter and aerial bombardments of civilians populations. Hundreds of thousands of mostly southern-allied Sudanese have been displaced over the last couple of years and are living in camps.

According to media reports (somewhat reserved in tone, and with clear caveats), progress was made during the talks this week. The Africa Union mediator, former South African leader Thabo Mbeki, stated that both Bashir and Kiir had agreed to actually implement an agreement on having a buffer-zone between their respective territories. They also agreed to create a timetable for implementing outstanding agreements, which should be created in the next week or so. After this, it’s argued that the two nations could be in a position to move towards a joint administration of Abyei, and begin pumping oil again.

In summary, what came out of the talks was:

1. A commitment to implement agreements

2. An agreement to write up a timetable moving towards those agreements

What’s important to note is that the agreements in question were pretty much all negotiated back in September 2012- it’s just that over the last 4 months, neither party has actually implemented what they both said they agreed to. Now they’ve agreed that they need to implement what they’ve agreed. And agreed to agree to a timetable to implement what they’ve agreed. It’s clearly all very agreeable between the two nations.

Which of course, it isn’t. Neither Kiir nor Bashir made any statement after the talks. The reason why nothing’s been done for four months is that neither side trusts the other, and the two nations remain, if not on the brink of war, then at least wallowing in mutual animosity. In fact, a source tells me, the presence of large numbers of women around the Sheraton Addis over the conference weekend indicates that the diplomatic parties may well be more interested in the extra-curricular activities on offer, as actually reaching any meaningful deal.

Omar al Bashir and Salva Kiir may have shaken hands and smiled for the cameras, but I suspect this has more to do with wanting to avoid international sanctions for being belligerent, than any genuine warmth, hope, or interest in compromise the two leaders have towards one another. Not to mince words, Bashir and Kiir are enemies. Both are military men, and both have thrown their respective armies at each other on and off for the last thirty and more years. Bashir took Sudan in a military coup in 1983, and the second Sudanese Civil War took off shortly afterwards. Kiir was one of the most senior military commanders under SPLM/A leader John Garang. And this was no gentlemans’ conflict, no Geneva conventions. The war was a vicious, bloody one, with terrible atrocities committed by both sides.

More than three decades of unresolved hatred lies between the two men, and whatever show they may put on for the diplomats, there is nothing to suggest in either man’s actions that there is any interest in reconciliation- nor would there be any real reason to suggest such a thing should happen. The peace between north and south, and the subsequent referendum on southern independence, is entirely externally engineered. South Sudan owes its independence to the intervention of what was then the world’s largest humanitarian operation, coupled by regional (and almost certainly clandestine Western) military support, driven by interests in the south’s oil and mineral reserves, which are substantial. Were it not for Operation Lifeline Sudan, advocates in US congress, the Cold War politics that pitched US interest in the south’s resources against Khartoum, and the pro-SPLM/A stance of several East African governments (particularly Uganda’s Museveni), there’s little question that Juba would be nothing more than a district-level hub in Khartoum-controlled Sudan by now, and the SPLA likely running a low-level insurgency from the bush, like countless other sub-Saharan rebel groups.

There’s more than just old hatred driving the inaction between the two sides though. The thing is, it may have taken a different guise, but the war is still going on. Bashir wants to crush South Sudan. Losing the south has been the biggest blow to his Presidency. From a northern perspective, southern independence is an incredible loss of face. It represents a military defeat and an economic emasculation. From the perspective of the political psyche of Khartoum, a vast swathe of Sudanese territory (and resources) has been annexed to a sworn enemy. Bashir knows he cannot retake the south militarily at this time- in part because the SAF does not have the military capacity, and in part because western powers would not stand idly by and let him.

For Bashir, the best option is to encourage South Sudan to fail as a state. Already the world’s newest nation, South Sudan is also perhaps the world’s most fragile (depending on the various ways it can be stacked up against Somalia). The dispute over oil revenues provides a perfect opportunity for Bashir to choke Juba. By raising taxes on oil through the north, either the south was going to find its revenue slowly held to higher and higher ransom while feeding the coffers (and the war-machine) of the north or, as happened, be forced to cut off oil altogether. And while this equates to a blow for Khartoum’s revenues, Sudan at least has other sources of income. South Sudan, by contrast, basically has nothing. 90-odd percent of its income comes from that oil, and without it, it has been surfing the edge of bankruptcy since. Already inflation in the south is out of control, unemployment rampant, and the government (frail and corrupt to begin with) is all but broke, propped up by the band-aid of international assistance and little else.

At the same time, Bashir has been quietly running ammunition to dissenters within the south. Far from being a coherent nation, at the time of independence there were nearly 30 disparate militia groups-many of them divided along ethnic lines- and bringing these various armies to heel has been an imperfect process. The intense violence seen between Nuer and Dinka groups over the last 18 months is testimony to the very fragile threads that hold the ‘nation’ together- only ever at its strongest when united against the common foe of the north. With ‘peace’, fractures appear and groups turn on each other, settling old scores and creating new ones. Evidence suggests Bashir has been fueling this by supplying bullets to anti-SPLA forces, further weakening Juba’s ability to manage the state’s affairs.

But delaying the flow of oil is not just a tactic that Khartoum is using to its advantage. While Sudan may have more income sources than South Sudan, the reduced oil revenues are still a critical shortfall in its annual accounting, and Kiir knows this. In a way, both nations are now relying on their outside supporters: For Khartoum, China, and for Juba, the western ‘International Community’- and also China.

Kiir knows that Bashir is currently the weakest he’s ever been. The loss of the south undermined Bashir’s authority and the confidence of people (including some in the SAF) of his capacity to rule. The International Criminal Court has issued warrants for Bashir’s arrest in conjunction with crimes against humanity, as well as against several of his key leadership, as well as accompanying sanctions- further weakening both his political position, and his authority. Not only have assessments of SAF military capability demonstrated a vastly weaker force than it has been in the past, but there have been several attempts at popular demonstrations and uprisings a-la Arab Spring- which have been quickly, fiercely and quietly put down. None the less, the fact that these protests have happened demonstrates his weakening position. Further to that, recent analysis of his nexus of power- political, military and religious- shows he is more vulnerable now than at any point in the last couple of decades.

For this reason too, Kiir is unlikely to take any meaningful steps to rein in the SPLA-N. Although he publically denies supporting them, nobody seriously questions the links between the rebels (southerners operating in northern territory) and Juba. The ongoing fighting sucks up Khartoum’s resources and, somewhere in there, with a weakened SAF in the mix, no doubt Kiir is hoping that perhaps there may even be an opportunity to gain a conventional upper-hand. After all, only a few years ago a column of Darfur rebels made it all the way to Omdurman, on the outskirts of Khartoum, before they were destroyed. I am sure that in his happy place, Kiir envisages the potential of pro-southern rebels breaching SAF defences and moving on the capital, or if not, then creating enough political space to allow a popular uprising to foment.

Interestingly, the south continues to hold the sympathy card, at least as far as Western support goes. A hangover from the days when the SPLM/A and the South Sudanese were seen as victims of northern aggression during the 80s and 90s (courtesy, in a large part, due to western media and supporters in US Congress), the west continues to sympathise with the southerners, with stories of ethnic cleansing and bombing raids by Antonovs in South Kordofan and Unity State featuring predominately in the narrative. The fact that the SPLA-N is in part responsible for stirring up this renewed aggression (most atrocities carried out by SAF and pro-north militia were ostensibly attempts to weed out southern militia fighters) doesn’t get as much mention. Nor, due in part to limited media and observer access, do claims of bombings and killings by northern forces get a lot of critical analysis- they are reported at face value (with that very caveat- ‘reported’)- which is all the south needs. Meanwhile, a friend closer to informants than I am tells me that in fact, in some of these cases, there’s reason to think that many of these accounts of bombings are in fact being made up by the south to bolster their political position.

Both Kiir and Bashir are playing the long game here. Bashir would like nothing more than to see the south implode- ideally, in his books, without having to lift a military finger, which keeps him ‘clean’ in the eyes of the international community. Delaying the flow of oil as long as possible, for example by stringing out internationally-mediated negotiations, will play right into this game. Kiir, on the other hand, is hoping that by keeping pressure- military and economic- on an increasingly fragile north, may yet give him the upper hand and weaken Bashir’s hold on power until he’s overthrown or replaced by the military. Kiir’s game is a particularly high-stakes one: The north has more reserves than the south and can probably hold out far longer, but he may be counting either on the current trend of MENA nations to revolt against unpopular despots, or the fact that the international community simply can’t afford to let South Sudan fail, and will prop it up whatever it takes, even while the economy chokes. In the meantime, there are enough regional powers no doubt quietly sinking funds into the SPLA against the SAF (Museveni hasn’t gone anywhere) that the SPLA-N is unlikely to run out of support just yet.

Left to their own devices, it’s doubtful that the two nations could avoid war, almost certain that they wouldn’t make significant headway in building a sustainable and cooperative peace. There are a few wild-cards in the mix though. Western support is one. As mentioned, the extent to which the US, the UN, Europe, other nations and aid groups prop up the almost non-existent South Sudanese economy will be a factor in how long Juba can hold out against Khartoum. The pressure these parties bring to bear to force a grudging resolution is also in the mix- and clearly, it continues to bring both parties to the negotiating table, albeit leaving plenty of room for delay tactics. The Chinese also play a big part here- with the potential to either offset western agendas, or reinforce them. One thing is clear, however, and that is that with the unpopularity of NATO involvement in Libya, and the public-relations disasters that were the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, there is little chance of significant western engagement in the Sudans to intervene should things get messier, and both sides know this.

One nation that does have both capacity and political will to intervene is Ethiopia, which already has forces deployed around Abyei and continues to host peace negotiations. I won’t say much more about that, but for anybody interested, I’d suggest looking at the Rennaissance Dam project currently underway on Ethiopia’s Blue Nile, and the negative reaction it’s received from Cairo and, pertinently, Khartoum. Then ask whether in fact there could be some sympathy towards opponents of Khartoum as a result, particularly rebel groups operating in Blue Nile state and undermining the current regime’s capacity. Just a thought.

The piece that gets periodically touted as a possible solution for southern economic independence is the construction of an oil pipeline out of Kenya, instead of Sudan. There was talk at one stage of this being bankrolled by China, and depending on who I talk to and the angle of the sunshine, I hear either that groundwork is underway, or its been abandoned as a bad idea. At the very least, such a pipeline would take many years to build and would offer no short-term respite. It would also have to run through extremely insecure terrain- through zones fought over by warring South Sudanese tribes, then through areas in northern Kenya similarly afflicted by tribal warfare, and finally exiting on Kenya’s troubled coastline, where seperatists in Mombasa as well as ethnic rivalries in coastal areas further north continue to raise their head. Not to mention making a big shiny target for the disgruntled Somali militant element within Kenya. According to the most recent snippet of analysis I heard, the cost of the pipeline is so prohibitive, South Sudan’s current oil reserves are insufficient to make the new pipeline worthwhile.

I don’t want to sound hopeless. There’s always hope. However thin that sliver of light might be. And international pressure (particularly from the Chinese quarter) has potential. So too might a significant undermining of Bashir’s position, should that trend continue, as he may be forced to make concessions from a place of weakness. However, as another observer has pointed out, you have to question whether a meaningful cooperative peace between Sudan and South Sudan is possible with two enemies such as Bashir and Kiir at the helms of their respective governments. Extrapolating further, given that both nations have governments that are deeply entrenched with military personnel- men with direct combat experience against their foe- doesn’t inspire many positive thoughts. However, perhaps as one generation passes and another rises, if the prospect of another all-out war like the 1983-2005 one can be avoided, perhaps there’ll be the chance to build true reconciliation.

In the meantime, I think we can expect to see continued stalling, to see Bashir’s trademark diplomatic two-step, and Kiir to continue to play the international sympathy card, while very deliberately running his own violent agenda. Progress, such that it might be, will most likely be drip-fed, with more talk than action. Fighting by proxy-militia is a given, and will happen north and south of the border, and when the pressure isn’t on Bashir on his side, then it’s likely that he’ll find ways to invest spare capacity in stirring up disgruntled populations within the south in an effort to undermine his foe. If the oil starts flowing again- and it’ll still be months at best before it does- then it’ll be an action begrudged on both sides, and probably muscled through with some heavy-hitting diplomacy and some not-so-subtle carrots and sticks.

In short, change, if any, will be slow coming, unwillingly shared, and unlikely to make much difference for the millions of Sudanese on both sides of the border suffering from conflict, from economic marginalization, and from the disease and malnutrition that are the hallmarks of mass displacement in harsh environments.

Note: My apologies for the lack of sources and URLs on this post. I’m not a journalist, so my rigor probably isn’t what it should be when it comes to keeping notes and sources. I’ve collected the information above over a number of weeks & months from various web sources, but my internet connectivity at the moment isn’t really strong enough to spend a lot of time scouring old tweets and links for original material. If I get time later I’ll try and link to info as I rediscover it. In the meantime, feel free to call me on anything you think is inaccurate. -MA

Amharic Wanderings

I’ve recently returned from a week of work travel in north-western Ethiopia. Amhara Region has many claims, and among them, the claim to be the true ‘heartland’ of Ethiopia. Couched in the ancient highlands that were the natural fortress of old Abyssinia, it is a diverse and devastatingly beautiful landscape, full of history gone, and history still unfolding.

The region gives its name to both the dominant people group of Ethiopia, and the nation’s lingua franca- and hence the political as well as historical claim to be Ethiopia’s heartland. Both perspectives are easily challenged. Ethiopia is highly ethnically diverse, with over 80 ethnic groups, and its government carefully balances power among that recognized ethnic diversity: New Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn (who is a Wolayta, from the SNNPR) has appointed three deputy Prime Ministers, one each from Tigray, Oromia and Amhara (and have similarly ensured balanced religious representation, with one deputy being Muslim and two Orthodox, to compliment Hailemariam’s Protestant faith). Likewise, while Amharic is the state’s official language, and English has some currency as a foreign language understood by those who have completed secondary education, there are some 90 languages across Ethiopia, and native Amharic speakers make up just over a quarter of Ethiopia’s population. Geek fact: Amharic is the second most widely-spoken Semitic language in the world, after Arabic.

Amhara Region has somewhere in the vicinity of 18 million people, over 90% of them from the Amharic ethnic group (also a contested nomenclature) and most of them also Orthodox Christian. Its administrative capital is the town of Bahir Dar, which non-travellers to Ethiopia are unlikely to have heard of, but it is a pleasant and fast-growing town of nearly 200,000, with palm-lined avenues and magenta bougainvillea spilling over compound walls. It sits near the region’s centre on an inlet of Lake Tana, Ethiopia’s largest body of water and the source of the mighty Abbai- the Blue Nile (although the Piccolo Abbai- the Little Blue Nile) rises elsewhere in the south of the region to feed the lake, so in truth the lake is less the source, more a conduit).

Bahir Dar sits at an elevation of over 1,800m, which gives it a warm and gentle climate, just about perfect for walking around at night in a t-shirt at this equatorial latitude. Amusingly, when I asked colleagues about its elevation, I was told it was ‘very low’. I guess from Addis, at 2,500m, plenty of things seem low. In fact, Ethiopia has three main climatic zones, differentiated by altitude. The Kola, or lowlands, run up to 1,500m. The Woyinda Dega, or middle highlands, from 1,500-2,500m. And the Dega, or highlands, from 2,500m upwards. Most of Amhara Region is Woyinda Dega, but it also contains Ethiopia’s highest point, Ras Dashen, which perches at a lofty 4,550m.

Amhara Region’s better known locales, as well as Lake Tana and Ras Dashen, include the historic mountain city of Gondar, once seat to Abyssinian Emperors, the dramatic Simien Mountains, and Lalibela, famed for its rock churches. I’ve been told by people who’ve been there that the Simiens and Lalibela are two of the must-see places in the country, and I hope to get the chance to visit them someday. I did get a chance, on a late afternoon visit before my departing flight, to stop by the dramatic Blue Nile Falls. Due to a festival in Bahir Dar, an hour away, the hydro-electric power station that usually takes the river’s flow was switched off, and water diverted over the falls instead, and so the waterfall was in full thunderous flow, spray hanging in a great cloud in the evening sunlight.

The city of Gondar sits spread over several hilltops and the intervening valleys, at an altitude of a little over 2,100m. Like Bahir Dar- and many other corners of Ethiopia- it is a growing city and, deceptively, one of Ethiopia’s biggest, at a quarter of a million inhabitants. Its winding roads, forging pathways between buildings jostling for space on the hillsides, struck me at times as reminiscent of an Alpine town. The landscape has a Mediterranean dryness to it and sits beneath a haze that turns golden as the late-season sun sets behind the hills. At its heart grows the UNESCO-heritage King Fasilides’ castle, chief among a network of palaces first started in the 1600s whose remnants can be visited today- some, like Fasilides’ Castle itself, in excellent condition, others little more than ruins.

Gondar’s setting is beautiful, the surrounds of its approach moreso. Driving north from Bahir Dar, the road picks its way among rolling farmland and rocky hillocks, before climbing into the mountains proper. Before the mountain pass that leads into Gondar country, a great rock spire thrusts with phallic determination into the blue sky. Among the hills, the horizon is riven by outcrops and domes, while terraced fields and straw-roofed huts dot the valley floors. The terrain is dry, but not arid. Wildflowers bloom and grass is ripe for haying.

South of Bahir Dar, the landscape changes again. Instead of the dry hills of Gondar, the highlands are green and damp. Around the grubby crossroads of Injibara, hilltops are crowned with trees, as much as 10% of the land area in this heavily-populated and -farmed district still forested. The skyline is no less dramatic, however, with great protrusions of rock jutting into brooding clouds, while in the foreground, a patchwork of smallholdings is testament to the bustling agricultural sector. Fields are full of horses, and we pass riders in ceremonial garb, their mounts bedecked in white cloaks with red cloth baubles dangling at every trot. When one afternoon it rains, a rainbow paints itself over a spreading valley of fields. Driving back to town, the green of crops not-yet-ripened is somehow far more intense beneath the stormy clouds.

Following the road west, we pass through Chagni, a dusty outpost town with nothing to recommend itself, even to my colleagues, who commented distastefully that the place hadn’t changed in twenty years. Perhaps not quite true- construction on a large mosque in the centre of town was nearing completion, the two minarets like rockets standing against a blue sky, the dome covered in makeshift scaffolding that looked fragile enough to come down with a sturdy kick.

Past Chagni, the road winds among more hills, crosses the barrier that marks the division between Amhara Region and Benishangul-Gumuz, and plunges. Not a hundred yards past the checkpoint, it skirts the face of a great escarpment that drops into the rolling lowlands spreading out for a couple of hundred kilometres to the Sudanese border. The landscape undulates, instantly dry. Orange dust like the slappings of a chalkboard eraser coats trees at the side of the road, lending them an ochre pall.

Villages bounce by, no longer the rectangular tin-roofed homes of the Amhara, but round-walled tukuls like those found in Kenya and South Sudan. In fact even the people are reminiscent of South Sudan. The Gumuz are not as tall as the Nuer or the Dinka, but their skin is dark like coal compared to the relatively fair Amhara. The women walk barefooted in groups, sticks balanced across their shoulders from which they hang plastic jerry cans of water, or other supplies, up to 50kg of weight. Broad-horned cattle roam the countryside. Mixed brush, trees and thorn bushes, grows thick here, and in the golden haze-hung light of a setting sun, this is textbook National Geographic Africa.

There’s more to Bahir Dar- and Ethiopia generally- than its landscape. Some of this I’ll explore in later posts, for sure. But I was struck on this trip by the utter beauty of the scenery. The hills and mountains, the light and the variety of the place made it one of the more eye-catching and memorable journeys I’ve taken through the byways of this continent- and I’ve taken a few by now. Ethiopia- and Amhara specifically- does have a reputation as a tourist destination among some circles- especially the Simiens (for trekking) and Gondar and Lalibela, for the anthropoligically-minded. However it was the remote and rugged terrain in the south and west of the region that really drew me in, and I hope to go back for a longer trip soon, one in which I’m actually there to take time over the photography, and not just rush from one field visit to the next.

Sudan: A Beginner’s Guide

On the 9^th of July 2011, Southern Sudan will declare its independence from the rest of Sudan and become the world’s newest country. It’s a moment that the Southern Sudanese and their supporters have been anticipating for many years, and comes off the back of more than five decades of warfare, punctuated by only brief breaths of peace.

Yet the news now is full of concern rather than celebration. A fresh outbreak of war seems pending, as analysts scramble to work out what’s going to happen next. Some of that analysis is far from rosy.

But what’s actually going on in Sudan? If you’re new to the Sudanese context it can be pretty confusing. What’s the fighting about and who is involved? How does the civil war that keeps getting talked about relate to the ‘genocide’ in Darfur? How did this all come about? If you’re a bit bamboozled by the bylines, this post should give you a high-level picture of how we got this far.

Map: Detailed map of Sudan’s states

Ancient History

Sudan’s a big place. The largest in Africa, the tenth largest in the world. It’s got about 40 million people, spread over nearly 600 ethnic groups- making it one of the most ethnically diverse nations in the world. Over the last couple of millennium, it’s variously consisted of some 50 states.

Colonialism, in all its glory, whacked this mob together within one solid black line and called it Sudan. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Britain and Egypt (with some customary flip-flopping) shared governance of the realm. Egypt (as a proxy caretaker on behalf of the British) governed northern Sudan from the new capital of Khartoum, while Britain administered southern Sudan at arm’s length.

The divide was more than administrative. Islam had been diffusing across northern Sudan for many centuries, while the south was largely animistic in religion and culture. The north was predominately desert and scrubland, while further south the ground grew wetter, with mixed woodland and, eventually in the far south, tropical rainforest.

The colonial division of Sudan meant that the north was effectively run as an Arab-Muslim kingdom, while the south was administered as a British colony in the order of other East African states (Kenya, Buganda, Tanganyika…), with Christian missionaries running many of the services in an otherwise sparsely-explored, -developed or even -penetrated land.

Thus, pre-existing differences in geography and resource-allocation were further entrenched through very different styles of political governance, through the adoption of opposed religious practices, and through an increased sense of Arabicization in the north versus more prominent sub-Saharan African ethnic groupings in the south.

Map: Northern Sudan in light yellow, Southern Sudan in light purple

North-South Civil War

In 1956, Sudan was granted independence as a single nation, to be governed from Khartoum and the old Arab-dominated administration left by the Egyptians. The south, resentful and distrustful of the north and its policies, had already laid the seeds for civil war with a military uprising in 1955 that led to all-out civil war. This war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) lasted, with a brief interlude from ‘72-’83 and with various surges and lulls, until 2005, when a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was signed, brokered largely by the Americans.

As well as the underlying divide, the conflict also played out as part of Cold War politics. The Soviets poured weapons and funding into Khartoum in order to maintain control of Sudan’s rich oil reserves, situated largely in territory allocated to the South. (While the Cold War has ended, this continues to play a major component in the politics of war and peace in Sudan, with the Chinese blindly investing in the North in order to access rights to its resources, and the West taking an unusually intense interest in the outcome of Southern independence as well.)

The war was Africa’s longest-lasting civil conflict and claimed over 2 million lives, with 2 to 4 million people displaced as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Decisions by the north to impose Islamic laws on the south and push for the spread of Islam (such as putting money into building mosques over other service provision) provided further incentives for the south to keep fighting. In 1989 a coup by military officers put now-President Omar al Bashir in control of the Khartoum government, and he maintained a hard stance in the conflict and in terms of pushing for the Islamicization of Sudan. (Bashir is now wanted by the International Criminal Court for war-crimes in Darfur).

The war was an uncommonly brutal one. The North made use of extensive bombing campaigns using Soviet aircraft that targeted civilians, not just military targets. Very little infrastructure was left standing in the South as a result (and at the time of the signing of the CPA in 2005, the country effectively had to start building itself from the ground up). Mass displacement led to widespread famine and disease- responsible for a large portion of the two million fatalities. As the SAF seized control of major towns and roads, the SPLA withdrew into the countryside, fighting a vicious guerrilla campaign which brought more suspicion and suffering on civilian populations. Mines were laid extensively. Human rights violations abounded.

A particular (and particularly important) facet of the war was the use of proxy militias. The political and ethnic fragmentation of the Southern portion of the country leant itself to domination by warlords, whose forces would then ally with one or other of the major warring parties. For the most part, the SPLA provided a rallying point for most of the southern militias. However at times, internal politics or external greed prompted various groups to switch sides, sometimes returning at a later point when allegiance suited. These militias often operated with a large degree of impunity and used the context of the larger war to settle local scores with neighbouring groups, resulting in more civilian casualties and atrocities. Skirmishes with these warlords and their militias have continued since the signing of the CPA.

In the midst of this, the international community launched what was at the time the largest humanitarian operation in history, Operation Lifeline Sudan. OLS was run out of Kenya, with its Forward Operating Base, Lokichoggio, a vast relief city in the desert of Turkana. Food, aid and expatriates were flown into Sudan on a daily basis in support of the southern population- arousing suspicion in Khartoum which remains to this day. At its peak, Loki was the third busiest airport on the African continent, the town thrumming each dawn with the roar of WFP cargo planes taking off for their routine food-drops. The sheer volume of aid added a new dimension to the war, with both sides attempting to manipulate this supposedly ‘impartial’ aid delivery to its own ends, forcing civilian populations this way and that to suit their resource needs.

Darfur

 As hostilities between North and South were drawing down to a tacit ceasefire, simmering unrest in other parts of the nation were starting to bubble over. Khartoum’s policies of centralization, Arabicization and Islamicization had marginalized other groups. Most notable among these were a couple of prominent factions in the remote West of Sudan in a region known as Darfur: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

From 2003, triggered by Khartoum’s exploitation of new oil reserves and seeing the level of international recognition the SPLM/A had received as a result of their push for freedom from Khartoum, the SLA and the JEM took up arms against Khartoum. Bashir’s response, as well as mobilizing regular armed forces, was to arm a militia, ostensibly made up at least partially of released prisoners, known as the Janjawid. The Janjawid, a highly mobile and often horse-backed group of vicious fighters, became synonymous with the burning of villages, the rape and murder of civilians, and implementing an unspoken policy of ethnic cleansing.

The resulting conflict became very messy, very fast. Between two and four million people fled their homes (out of a starting population of 6 million), settling in a series of IDP camps across a desolate and arid area the size of France, largely lacking roads or other infrastructure. Chad, resentful of the support that Khartoum had given to opposition rebel groups during its own civil war years earlier, poured support into the Darfur rebels which resulted in a tense and lawless cross-border situation. The humanitarian operation was stymied by a Khartoum government which was both belligerent and distrustful of the incoming aid agencies, and also had no vested interest in seeing the population supported. Red tape was thrown up at any opportunity, while aid agencies were frequently punished with expulsion and the revocation of permits.

The fighting continued. The war was characterized as being one between Arabs and ‘Africans’, although on ethnic terms the differentiation was hazy at best. However at day’s end, as well as the macro-level context of an uprising by a marginalized people against a non-representative and distant government, this was really a resource conflict. The players polarized themselves largely along the lines of groups that traditionally practiced sedentary agriculture versus those that traditionally practiced more nomadic livestock rearing. The conflict, at its most basic, was about who controlled wells, grazing land and firewood and, from a government perspective, the small but significant new finds of oil.

Over the next few years, the conflict fragmented. The government lost control of the Janjawid, while the rebel groups split into around 30 different forces, with alliances shifting so rapidly they were almost impossible to track, let alone resolve. Banditry- partly to resource fighting, partly for profit for its own sake- blossomed, and aid workers with their shiny Land Cruisers, disposable cash and walkie-talkies were prime targets. Anarchy reigned.

Meanwhile, Elsewhere…

At the same time the SLA and JEM were consolidating their struggle for recognition, groups in the far east of the country, in Kassala and Red Sea States, were instigating their own rebellion. With support from the SLA and JEM, militias like the Beja Congress under the flag of the Eastern Front also started a low-key insurgency, and while it didn’t get far, it remains a tense point to this day.

In Kordofan, like Darfur consisting of three states- West, South and North- the conflict from Darfur was spilling over. For a while analysts were concerned that it was going to explode in the same way as Darfur, but while there were a number of reports of village massacres, the focus remained on Darfur.

Several areas remained, however, flashpoints for violence. Kordofan had been deeply divided during the North-South wars, with militias (most notably the Nuba) aligning with the South while the state remained occupied by the North. Likewise portions of Blue Nile (belonging to the North) and Upper Nile (belonging to the South) were made up of a patchwork of proxy militias and their complex alliances, which continue to simmer to this day.

There is, of course, the contentious Unity State. Unity- never a more inappropriately named location- is apparently sopping with oil, and is subsequently claimed by both the North and the South. Under the 2005 CPA, Unity’s future was supposed to be determined by a state referendum, but neither the North nor the South could agree on a structure to the referendum, particularly because the North wanted Arab nomads who crossed the territory to be given a vote (as they would vote to join the North) while the South did not.

One of the biggest threats to the stability of Southern Sudan as a nation is its very ethnic diversity. Conflict between ethnic groups, clans and even families at a very local level has strong currency in the micro-politics of the area. Disagreements, usually over cattle or women, used to be settled with spears, bows and knives. Today they are settled with 7.62mm rounds on fully-automatic. Interclan tussles used to score their casualties in ones and twos. Now they’re counted in twenties and forties. While the North-South war kept a lid on much of this and provided a common enemy to unite otherwise-belligerent factions, since the signing of the CPA there has been a marked increase in ethnic tension in Southern Sudan. If war with the North does not eventuate, the SPLM will still need to contend with this very real threat to remain viable.

In the last few years, the despicable Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), pushed ever northwards by the Ugandan army, has established itself in the forests of Western Equatoria, in the far south of the country. Known for its brutal campaigns against villages- seizing children as soldiers, porters and sex slaves- it has continued its trademark attacks against Sudanese villages and continues to create tension in that area.

Map: Zones of tension in Sudan
Orange: Northern Sudan
Blue: Southern Sudan
Pink: Kordofan, Blue Nile
Green: Darfur
Purple: Eastern Front
Yellow: Abyei

Spiralling Towards Independence

In many ways, Sudan and its constituents are holding their breath. This year’s referendum, timetabled by the CPA and independently monitored, clearly stated that the South (as voted on by Southerners) would cecede- a vote of 99%. This is clearly not in the interests of the North, but for now, the North has little power to stop this from happening without angering the entire International Community. This doesn’t stop it playing games. Like cutting off the South’s access to its oil pipeline for export.

From there, SAF incursions into Unity State (Abyei) late in May made international headlines as the potential signal for an impending civil war post-independence. Whether designed to test international waters and the Southern reaction, whether planned as a pre-positioning of forces, whether a statement of ownership, or whether to drive out pro-South populations, the move demonstrated the weakness of the UN resolve to step in and intervene.

It also demonstrated the unwillingness- for now- of the SPLA to respond with significant force. This can be chalked up to the SPLM’s concern that nothing should jeopardize the handover of independence in 2 weeks’ time. After the July 9 transition, their restraint may be weaker.

The United Nations has been instructed by Khartoum to end its mandate in Sudan once the South has its independence. That means from July 9, the UN will need to withdraw its peacekeepers from any territory controlled by the north, including South Kordofan.

(Rumours that the UN in the South may also be asked to leave- possibly an internal political manoeuvre relating to dissatisfaction with bilateral donor support for the SPLM- are currently unsubstantiated, but this also would create a significant concern in the light of increasing tensions.)

A tentative agreement has been reached by both the North and the South that a contingent of Ethiopian peacekeepers will take control of Abyei while a long-term solution is agreed. Of course, it’s been 6 years that a long-term solution has been discussed and still hasn’t been reached. But it’s better than slinging it out.

Meanwhile, Khartoum has refocused its efforts on Kordofan, with evidence of troop buildup, ethnic cleansing, arbitrary execution of political dissidents, and 60- to 100,000 people displaced from their homes (claims of up to half a million by local leaders). Strategically close to Abyei and Unity State, Khartoum may well be prepositioning itself for a much larger incursion.

Rumours of instability in Blue Nile are growing, with concerns about militia groups there and across the border in Upper Nile. Should conflict between North and South erupt, this will almost certainly become a major area of concern- and probably a highly complex one.

Although the war in Darfur is ‘different’ to the North-South conflict, many of the drivers- fear of Islamicization, Arabicization, marginalization, resource exploitation- are the same. The SLA and JEM (as still the major rebel figureheads negotiating with Khartoum) very much take their lead from what happens in the South, which they see as setting a precedent for their own struggle. What impact Southern independence, or a possible return to war with the South, triggers in Darfur remains to be seen. However with anarchy and banditry continuing to dominate, with the ongoing belligerent attitude of Khartoum towards NGOs, and with the UN having to close its mandate in the North, some impact is certain.

Sudan has it all. Beligerent governments. Long-standing ethnic grievences. Oil and resource conflict. Warlords with wavering loyalties. A harsh, unsupportive and disease-prone environment. Poor infrastructure. High aid dependency coupled with suspicion towards the international community. A contested border. High levels of international ‘interest’ in the outcome. And a lot of guns. And I mean, a lot.

Many observers agree that the Southern government is unlikely to embrace any large-scale response to hostilities this side of July 9. The government is occupied with managing transition- and ensuring it goes ahead. Even beyond that time, the SPLA does not have the training or equipment that the SAF possesses (not to say that certain western governments aren’t doing their damnedest to correct that imbalance). Whether we see a return to all-out war between North and South in the near future isn’t clear; it may not swing that way. However with the build-up of tension and troops in flashpoint areas such as Southern Kordofan and mutterings along the Nile, the chances of low-level conflict remain very high.

A likely campaign from the North, based on past performance, would involve the use of proxy militias in sensitive areas. These would be used to drive out pro-South populations and secure- de facto if not de jure- the areas it wants to control. The South may respond with similar tactics, or pour in more regular troops which could considerably escalate the conflict. Whichever path results, the outcome for civilian populations caught in the middle is grim.

That said, there’s no war yet. Negotiations over Abyei and Unity continue. While the North doesn’t want to lose its oil, if it declares war on the South it will exacerbate its international pariah status and find that China really does become its one and only ally- something which Bashir may be okay with, but will not do Sudan as a nation any favours over time. Likewise Southern Sudan’s President Salva Kiir, despite his cowboy appearance, has no wish for his fledgling nation to be embroiled in conflict while trying to consolidate a functioning state infrastructure. The South’s struggle to lift itself from what is undoubtedly one of the lowest rungs of the Human Development ladder will be hard enough without a war.

Note: I realise that many of my readers are going to be Sudan ‘experts’ with knowledge and information beyond what I have expressed here. Please do feel free to add commentary, facts or analysis I may have missed in the comments section- and yes, I know I have oversimplified some of what is a crazy complex context in this post!

Images: All photos (c) MoreAltitude 2011

1. Orange Palm: Sunset in Yambio, Equatorial Guinea, 2004

2. Forest Landing: Yambio airfield, Equatorial Guinea, 2004

3. Welcome to Rumbek: Rumbek Airport, Lakes State, 2004

4. Purple Palm: Sunset in Yambio, Equatorial Guinea, 2004

Map Credits: Image sources linked within images